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Strategic outsourcing revisited
Abstract
This paper analyzes a sequential game where firms decide about outsourcing the production of a
non-specific input good to an imperfectly competitive input market. We apply the taxonomy of business
strategies introduced by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) to characterize the different equilibria and find
that outsourcing generally softens competition in the final product market. If firms anticipate the impact
of their outsourcing decisions on input prices, there may be equilibria where firms outsource so as to
collude or to raise rivals' costs. We illustrate our analysis using a linear Cournot model.
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1 Introduction
Outsourcing has become a widespread phenomenon in the industrialized world in recent
times. Examples for industries where outsourcing is a key feature of the organization
of production abound: aircraft, cars, computers, mobile phones, audio/video systems,
mechanical watches etc. Casual evidence suggests that information technology (IT) and
related business services are regularly contracted out in a large number of industries
(Domberger 1998), and econometric studies assign a prominent role to outsourcing in
various industries.1 Yet, it is probably fair to say that the industrial organization liter-
ature on outsourcing is relatively thin.2
In a recent paper in this journal, Shy and Stenbacka (2003) have provided the first
intra-industry analysis of the strategic incentives that oligopoly firms face when out-
sourcing the production of inputs.3 In their model, diﬀerentiated Bertrand duopolists
can either undertake investments into in-house production facilities for a specialized in-
put, or they can buy that input from a subcontractor, but at higher variable cost. Hence,
if firms do not want to bear the fixed cost of investing into in-house production facilities,
they have to incur higher marginal cost for sourcing the input over the market.
The present paper analyzes a similar trade-oﬀ, but diﬀers from Shy and Stenbacka in
three crucial aspects: (i) We focus on outsourcing the production of a non-specific input
rather than an input specifically tailored to the needs of final good production. The
equilibrium market price of this non-specific input will depend on the vertical structure
of the industry, since a firm’s outsourcing decision aﬀects input demand (and possibly
1See e.g. Abraham and Taylor (1996), Fixler and Siegel (1999), Feenstra and Hanson (1999), Holmes
(1999), and Görzig and Stephan (2002).
2Following Coase (1937), the choice of a firm’s production mode has traditionally been discussed in
the context of transaction cost analysis. Prominent contributions by Williamson (1985), Grossman and
Hart (1986), and Hart and Moore (1990) have further pointed out that asset specificity and incomplete
contracts tend to make the organization of market transactions diﬃcult, thereby limiting the scope for
outsourcing. Based on this literature, Grossman and Helpman (2002) have studied the determinants of
the equilibrium production mode (i.e. integration vs. outsourcing) in industries where inputs are fully or
partially specialized. Another strand of the literature has focused on international outsourcing, i.e. the
fragmentation of production across borders. For instance, McLaren (2000) has analyzed the relation of
international openness and firms’ outsourcing decisions.
3There are a number of related earlier contributions. Bonanno and Vickers (1988) show that, if
franchise fees can be used to extract retailers’ surplus, a manufacturer will choose vertical separation as
its production mode, as it induces more friendly behavior from its rival manufacturer and thus facilitates
collusion. Gal-Or (1999) explores how asymmetric information between a manufacturer and a retailer
aﬀects integration decisions. Chen (forthcoming) examines the eﬀects that economies of scale may have
on production mode decisions. Finally, Jansen (2003) gives conditions under which vertical separation
is chosen by some upstream firms, while vertical integration is chosen by others in the equilibrium of a
symmetric model with Cournot competition downstream.
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also input supply), as suggested by the literature on successive oligopolies. We feel that
it is natural to account for changes in input prices, even though the previous outsourcing
literature has largely ignored them.4
(ii) We analyze sequential rather than simultaneous firm decisions about the pro-
duction mode. In this setting, we study the conditions under which the first-mover
may adopt outsourcing to raise rivals’ cost,5 and when outsourcing may serve as an
instrument of collusion in the final product market.
(iii) We propose a reduced-form approach towards analyzing outsourcing decisions
to accommodate for various forms of product market competition (including Bertrand
competition with diﬀerentiated products, as in Shy and Stenbacka). With the reduced-
form profit functions in place, we adopt the taxonomy of business strategies introduced
by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) to provide a general discussion of the potential strategic
outsourcing equilibria. Finally, we illustrate our analysis using a linear Cournot model
as a specific example.
Our main results are the following: First, in contrast to Shy and Stenbacka (2003),
we find that there may be asymmetric equilibria where one firm buys the input from
an existing input market, whereas the other firm produces the input internally. The
diﬀerence stems from the fact that we consider a non-specific input good, whereas Shy
and Stenbacka focus on a specific input good. In their setting, equilibria with only one
firm outsourcing cannot occur, as this firm would have to both cover the entire fixed
cost of the supplier and face higher marginal costs than with in-house production.6 In
our setting, asymmetric equilibria may emerge, as the non-specific input good may be
bought from an existing market without having to cover the entire fixed cost of any
given supplier.
Second, asymmetric equilibria are typically driven by the changes in input prices
associated with outsourcing. It is thus crucial to incorporate input price eﬀects into the
analysis of strategic outsourcing. To see this, consider an asymmetric equilibrium where
the first firm strategically abstains from outsourcing so as to induce outsourcing by the
second firm. The rationale of the first firm’s behavior is straightforward: By preventing
an initial increase of the input price, the second firm is induced to outsource and thus
4For instance, McLaren (2000, fn 17) states: “It would be natural to allow the inputs to aﬀect
marginal costs as well, but the resulting price eﬀects would be a tremendous source of additional
complication [...].” To our knowledge, there is only one other paper (on the relation of trade liberalization
and strategic outsourcing) by Chen et al. (2004) that considers input price eﬀects.
5The notion of raising rivals’ cost is familiar from Salop and Scheﬀman (1983, 1987). It is extensively
applied in the industrial organization literature on vertical foreclosure (see Rey and Tirole (forthcoming)
for a recent survey).
6That is, outsourcing becomes equivalent to setting up an input market that was inexistent before
that firm’s decision to outsource.
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to increase its own marginal cost. Unsurprisingly, there is no reversed asymmetric equi-
librium where the first firm outsources so as to prevent outsourcing by the second firm:
The first firm is not willing to prevent outsourcing by own outsourcing, as it will benefit
from the second firm’s marginal cost increase associated with outsourcing, provided that
it has not already outsourced.
Third, there may be a symmetric equilibrium where the first firm’s outsourcing in-
duces the second firm to outsource. In this equilibrium, firms successively outsource
production to the input market to raise their marginal costs, thereby softening competi-
tion in the final product market. That is, a “wave” of consecutive outsourcing decisions
may serve as a collusive device. Interestingly, there may also be a symmetric equilibrium
where the first firm does not outsource to avoid triggering outsourcing by the second
firm. This equilibrium may emerge if the softening of competition generated by a wave
of outsourcing decisions is insuﬃcient to compensate the first firm for its marginal cost
increase.
In sum, our analysis suggests that outsourcing generally softens competition in the
product market, irrespective of whether product market decisions are strategic comple-
ments or strategic substitutes. In the symmetric equilibrium where both firms source
the input good over the market (the outsourcing wave), the softening of competition
is collusive in nature. In the asymmetric equilibrium where only the second firm out-
sources, the softening of competition is strategically induced by the first firm, but the
second firm’s marginal cost increase is self-inflicted. Finally, the first firm will strate-
gically avoid triggering an outsourcing wave if the softening of competition associated
with outsourcing is insuﬃcient to increase its profit.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we introduce the
basic setup of our analysis, before we discuss the various candidate equilibria in section
3. For illustrative purposes, a linear Cournot model is presented in section 4. Section 5
concludes.
2 The Basic Setup
Consider a duopoly where two firms sell a final product (e.g. aluminium) to their cus-
tomers in a retail market. Each of the firms i = A,B operates a firm-specific technology
represented by (ci, Fi), where ci and Fi denote the marginal and fixed cost, respectively,
of producing a non-specific input good (e.g. electricity). That is, potentially one of the
firms may have a cost advantage in producing the non-specific input good. Assume that
firms transform the input good into the final product at constant marginal cost.
Now, suppose that rather than producing the input good in-house, firms may out-
4
source the production of the input good, i.e. they may avoid the fixed cost of producing
the input in-house and buy it from an input market at an equilibrium market price w
instead. It is natural to assume that to avoid the fixed cost of in-house production,
firms must shut down their in-house production facilities. That is, even in the absence
of binding long-term delivery contracts with input suppliers, firms cannot switch back
from outsourcing to in-house production without facing significant costs for re-installing
in-house production facilities. We therefore impose that firms can credibly commit to
their mode of organization.
Assume w.l.o.g. that firm A decides about its mode of organization before firm B,
and let Vi reflect firm i’s outsourcing decision (“make-or-buy”) such that
Vi =
(
0, if there is no outsourcing (“make”),
1, if there is outsourcing (“buy”),
i = A,B.
In general, firm i’s equilibrium profit will be a function of outsourcing decisions Vi, i =
A,B. To account for various forms of product market competition (e.g. Cournot or
diﬀerentiated Bertrand), we adopt a reduced-form approach and denote equilibrium
profits by πi(VA, VB), i = A,B. Similarly, we write the equilibrium input market price
as w(VA, VB). In the following, we shall make use of the following basic assumptions on
the input price:
(A1) w(VA, VB) > ci, i = A,B.
(A2) w(VA, VB) is increasing in Vi, i = A,B.
Assumption (A1) imposes that the equilibrium price in the input market is strictly
higher than the internal marginal cost of either firm producing the input good. Intu-
itively, this means that there is a mark-up in the input market associated with imperfect
competition. Note that (A1) also restricts attention to non-trivial strategic outsourcing:
If (A1) is violated, outsourcing will be a dominant strategy for at least one of the firms,
as outsourcing not only allows to eliminate investments costs Fi, but also reduces per-
ceived marginal costs.7 Since we want to focus on strategic outsourcing in this paper,
we shall exclude such cases.
Assumption (A2) implies that a firm’s decision to outsource production of the input
good raises the equilibrium input price w, since an increase in the number of firms pur-
chasing in the input market enhances input demand. As noted, the previous outsourcing
literature has largely ignored the demand-enhancing eﬀect of outsourcing decisions. Yet,
7For instance, consider the case where (A1) is violated since cA < w(VA, VB) ≤ cB. In this case,
outsourcing will be a dominant strategy for firm B.
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demand-induced input price eﬀects are crucial for understanding strategic behavior in
vertically-related industries. It is therefore not surprising that input price eﬀects play
a prominent role in well-known models of successive oligopolies. For example, both
Salinger (1988, p. 352) and Abiru et al. (1998) show that input prices may rise if more
firms purchase in the input market. At this point, it is important to note that–with the
firms’ reduced-form profits properly interpreted–(A2) also allows for retail firms being
active as sellers in the input market if they decide to engage in in-house production. In
this case, a firm’s decision to outsource will not only enhance input demand but may also
reduce input supply, reinforcing the positive input price eﬀect of outsourcing discussed
above. Since the supply eﬀect (if any) will reinforce the demand eﬀect, we shall abstract
from the supply side eﬀect and focus on the demand eﬀect below.
Given this setting, firm i’s strategic outsourcing decision deals with a trade-oﬀ similar
to that in Shy and Stenbacka: Firm i faces fixed investment costs Fi and constant
marginal costs ci in the case of in-house production, and no fixed costs, but higher
marginal costs w (·) > ci in the case of outsourcing.
For the following discussion, it is helpful to introduce the following notation.
Notation 1 (profit diﬀerentials) For k = 1, 2, i = A,B, let ∆ki denote the profitabil-
ity of outsourcing by firm i, where k indicates the total number of outsourcing firms.
Similarly, let ∆k−i, denote the eﬀect of firm i’s outsourcing on the competitor’s profit.
More specifically,
∆1A := πA(1, 0)− πA(0, 0); ∆2A := πA(1, 1)− πA(0, 1);
∆1B := πB(0, 1)− πB(0, 0); ∆2B := πB(1, 1)− πB(1, 0);
∆1−B := πA(0, 1)− πA(0, 0); ∆2−B := πA(1, 1)− πA(1, 0).
We can now distinguish four diﬀerent types of strategic interaction:
(i) ∆1B < 0;∆2B < 0 : Firm B’s dominant strategy is to produce the input good
in-house (VB = 0), irrespective of firm A’s decision. Firm A will thus decide to
outsource the production of the input good if ∆1A ≥ 0.
(ii) ∆1B > 0;∆2B > 0 : Firm B’s dominant strategy is to outsource (VB = 1) and pay
the market price w, irrespective of firm A’s decision. Firm A will thus decide to
outsource if ∆2A ≥ 0.
(iii) ∆1B > 0 > ∆2B : Firm B’s optimal choice of VB depends on firm A’s choice of VA.
More specifically, it is [not] profitable for firm B to outsource if firm A has decided
to “make” [“buy”] the input good. Firm A will thus be willing to outsource–
thereby strategically preventing B’s outsourcing–if πA(1, 0) > πA(0, 1).
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(iv) ∆1B < 0 < ∆2B : Firm B’s optimal choice of VB depends on firm A’s choice of VA.
More specifically, it is [not] profitable for firm B to outsource if firm A has decided
to “buy” [“make”] the input good. Firm A will thus be willing to outsource–
thereby strategically triggering B’s outsourcing–if πA(1, 1) > πA(0, 0).
If market conditions are such that type (i) or type (ii) is relevant, strategic interac-
tions matter only insofar as they determine the firms’ reduced-form profits πi, i = A,B,
by some form of imperfect product market competition. The firms’ equilibrium choices
of their production mode, however, are void of strategic interactions, since firm B has
a dominant strategy in both cases (in-house production for type (i) and outsourcing for
type (ii)). In the following, we limit the discussion to the more interesting types (iii) and
(iv). To analyze firms’ decisions for these two types, it is useful to apply the well-known
taxonomy of business strategies introduced by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984). Table 1
reproduces the diﬀerent strategies for the sequential outsourcing game under considera-
tion.8 Using terminology familiar from Tirole (1988, 325), we will say that outsourcing
makes firm A “tough” if it prevents further outsourcing by firm B (the left column of
the table) and “soft” if it triggers further outsourcing by firm B (the right column).
<Table 1 around here>
3 Understanding Outsourcing Equilibria
We now discuss whether the candidate equilibria identified in Table 1 emerge in our
sequential outsourcing game. In particular, we shall argue that the eﬀect of outsourcing
on the equilibrium input price w(·) is crucial for understanding strategic outsourcing
decisions.
3.1 Candidate Equilibria
We start with a discussion of the cases where outsourcing by firm B increases firm A’s
profit (the first row in Table 1, with ∆1−B > 0 or ∆2−B > 0, respectively).
First, consider the Puppy Dog strategy, where firm A does not outsource so as to
induce outsourcing by firm B. Under these circumstances, we know that outsourcing
by firm B alone is profitable (∆1B > 0). Furthermore, B’s outsourcing increases A’s
profit (∆1−B > 0). Intuitively, the latter follows from the fact that, after outsourcing,
firm B acquires the input good at higher marginal cost (w(0, 1) > cB by (A1)) and
8Note that the table summarizes the conditions for strategic outsourcing decisions. Clearly, the
overall comparison of profits before and after outsourcing remains crucial for the firms’ decisions.
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thus becomes a less aggressive competitor.9 Also, outsourcing makes A tough and pre-
vents further outsourcing by B (∆2B < 0). This preemptive eﬀect arises since after
A’s outsourcing, additional outsourcing by B would yield an even higher input market
price (w(1, 1) > w(0, 1) by (A2)), making outsourcing less attractive from B’s point of
view. Note that there is an interesting relation between the Puppy Dog strategy under
sequential outsourcing and the industrial organization literature on raising rivals’ cost,
initiated by Salop and Scheﬀman (1983, 1987). In the latter, a raising rivals’ cost eﬀect
is typically associated with aggressive behavior on the part of a vertically integrated firm
(i.e. a firm that has not outsourced).10 In the sequential outsourcing game considered
here, however, the raising rivals’ cost eﬀect is generated by soft or inoﬀensive play by the
vertically integrated firm A. Therefore, A’s adoption of the Puppy Dog strategy may be
viewed as a non-conventional way of raising rival’s cost.
Second, consider the Fat Cat strategy, where firm A outsources so as to induce
outsourcing by firm B. Under these conditions, outsourcing by B is profitable only if
A has already outsourced (∆1B < 0 < ∆2B), and B’s outsourcing increases A’s profit
(∆2−B > 0). Intuitively, the latter eﬀect follows from the fact that A ’s initial outsourc-
ing has increased its marginal cost to w(1, 0) > cA (by (A1)), making A a less aggressive
competitor. Further outsourcing by B (re-)establishes a level playing field where both
firms face even higher marginal cost of w(1, 1) > w(1, 0) > cB (by (A2)), thereby further
softening competition. In equilibrium, A will be ready to trigger such a sequence of
outsourcing decisions if πA(1, 1) > πA(0, 0). The latter condition implies that succes-
sive outsourcing decisions soften competition suﬃciently so as to overcompensate the
disadvantage of higher marginal cost.
Let us now consider the cases where outsourcing by firm B decreases firm A’s profit
(the second row in Table 1, with ∆1−B < 0 or ∆2−B < 0, respectively).
First, consider the Top Dog strategy, where firm A outsources so as to prevent
outsourcing by firm B. Under these circumstances, we know that outsourcing by firm B
alone is profitable (∆1B > 0). Furthermore, B’s outsourcing reducesA’s profit (∆1−B < 0).
In the following, we want to argue that firm A will never adopt the Top Dog strategy.
To understand why, observe that the condition (∆1−B < 0) does not make sense in the
outsourcing game under consideration. In fact, B’s outsourcing increases its marginal
cost to w(0, 1) > cB, making B a less aggressive competitor. As a result, B’s outsourcing
will increase rather than decrease A’s profit in virtually any oligopoly model of product
market competition. Hence, A will not be willing to prevent B’s outsourcing by own
9Of course, B’s outsourcing also eliminates the fixed cost FB, but this is irrelevant for determining
the intensity of competition in the product market.
10For example, a vertically integrated firm may refuse to deliver the input good to a vertically sepa-
rated downstream competitor.
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outsourcing.
Second, consider the Lean & Hungry Look strategy, where firm A does not outsource
so as to avoid triggering outsourcing by firm B. Under these conditions, outsourcing by
B is profitable only if A has already outsourced (∆1B < 0 < ∆2B), and B’s outsourcing re-
duces A’s profit (∆2−B < 0). To understand the latter eﬀect, suppose that A has already
outsourced. Now, B’s decision to outsource will further raise the input market price
to w(1, 1) > w(1, 0) (by (A2)), thereby increasing A’s marginal cost. In equilibrium, A
will adopt a Lean & Hungry Look strategy if the condition πA(0, 0) > πA(1, 1) is sat-
isfied. This condition implies that the softening of competition generated by successive
outsourcing is insuﬃcient to compensate A for its marginal cost increase.
3.2 Discussion
Our analysis supports Shy and Stenbacka’s (2003) finding that outsourcing may serve as
a collusive device by jointly raising marginal production costs. In our setting, a sequence
of two outsourcing decisions–an outsourcing wave–may be viewed as an instance of
collusion, if it is strategically triggered by the adoption of a Fat Cat strategy on the part
of the firm that moves first.11
Importantly, our analysis adds two related results: First, outsourcing may serve to
soften competition even if, in equilibrium, only one of the firms outsources. Given that
the softening of competition is attained by increasing marginal cost, each firm would
prefer the other firm to outsource. It is the first firm–having a first-mover advantage–
that decides about the allocation of the cost increase, adopting a Puppy Dog strategy.
Second, it may happen that the softening of competition associated with jointly raising
marginal costs is insuﬃcient to compensate the first firm for its marginal cost increase.
In this case, the first firm will adopt the Lean & Hungry Look strategy to avoid triggering
an outsourcing wave.
4 A Linear Cournot Example
In this section, we illustrate the above analysis using a simple linear Cournot model.
For this purpose, let us assume that the cost function of firm i is given by
Ci(qi) = (1− Vi)(αicqi + F ) + Vi(αiwqi), i = A,B,
11Recall that, if market conditions are such that type (ii) of strategic interaction occurs, B’s dominant
strategy is to outsource irrespective of A’s decision. In this case, a sequence of two outsourcing decisions
may occur for reasons unrelated to strategic considerations.
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where qi is firm i’s quantity and F > 0 is the fixed cost of producing in-house, i.e.,
both firms face the same fixed cost. The term αi ≥ 1 represents firm i’s eﬃciency in
transforming inputs into outputs.12 Marginal costs are constant and given by
C 0i = αi[(1− Vi)c+ Viw(Vi, Vj)],
depending on the firms’ outsourcing decisions Vi and Vj, i, j = A,B, i 6= j. If firm
i produces its input in-house (Vi = 0), the respective marginal cost for the input’s
production is c, while it is given by the input market price w if the firm is sourcing over
the input market (Vi = 1). Recall that the equilibrium input price is given by w(0, 1)
when only firm B outsources. In the reverse case, where only firm A outsources, the
wholesale price is w(1, 0). Finally, the equilibrium input price is w(1, 1) when both firms
outsource. Inverse demand is given by P (Q) = a− bQ, where P (Q) is the retail price,
and Q ≡ qA + qB is aggregate output. In the following, we assume for simplicity that
αB ≡ 1 and αA ≡ α ≥ 1. That is, firm A is at best as eﬃcient as firm B.
It is straightforward to calculate the following profit diﬀerentials for the linear Cournot
example:
∆1B = 19b (a+ αc− 2w(0, 1))
2 − 1
9b (a+ αc− 2c)
2 + F ;
∆2B = 19b (a+ αw(1, 1)− 2w(1, 1))
2 − 1
9b (a+ αw(1, 0)− 2c)
2 + F ;
∆1−B = 19b (a+ w(0, 1)− 2αc)
2 − 1
9b (a+ c− 2αc)
2 ;
∆2−B = 19b (a+ w(1, 1)− 2αw(1, 1))
2 − 1
9b (a+ c− 2αw(1, 0))
2 .
In the subsections below, we shall use these expressions for discussing the conditions
under which the various outsourcing equilibria described in section 3 may arise. We
consider each of the candidate equilibria in turn.
4.1 Puppy Dog
Recall from Table 1 that, in equilibrium, firm A will adopt the Puppy Dog strategy and
not outsource so as to induce outsourcing by firm B if both ∆1−B > 0 and ∆1B > 0 > ∆2B
are satisfied. Inspection indicates that∆1−B > 0 will always be satisfied, since w(0, 1) > c
by assumption (A1). Now consider the second condition. The first part of the second
condition (∆1B > 0) may be written as
(a+ αc− 2c)2− [a+ αc− 2w(0, 1)]2 < 9bF. (1)
12For instance, if firm i operates a 1:1 technology, firm i transforms one unit of the input good into
one unit of the final good, and we therefore have αi = 1. For a less eﬃcient firm, we have αi > 1.
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Inspection indicates that for (1) to be satisfied, B’s increase of marginal cost (w(0, 1)−c)
associated with outsourcing must be suﬃciently small relative to the fixed cost F of
producing the input in-house. That is, firmB’s marginal cost increase must not outweigh
the fixed cost savings associated with outsourcing. Otherwise, outsourcing by firm B
alone would not be profitable. The second part of the condition (∆2B < 0) may be
written as
(a+ αw(1, 0)− 2c)2− [a+ αw(1, 1)− 2w(1, 1)]2 > 9bF. (2)
Relation (2), i.e. ∆2B < 0, is more likely to hold the larger firmB’s marginal cost increase
(w(1, 1)− c) is relative to firm A’s marginal cost increase α(w(1, 1)−w(1, 0)), once firm
A has outsourced. Intuitively, this means that outsourcing is the less attractive for firm
B, the larger its own marginal cost increase and the smaller the raising rivals’ cost eﬀect
on firm A. Furthermore, (2) is more likely to be satisfied if firm A is relatively eﬃcient in
transforming inputs into outputs (α is relatively small), i.e. outsourcing is less attractive
for firm B if it faces an eﬃcient competitor A.
4.2 Fat Cat
According to Table 1, the adoption of a Fat Cat strategy requires that both ∆2−B > 0
and ∆1B < 0 < ∆2B are satisfied. The first of these conditions, which concerns the eﬀect
of B’s outsourcing on A’s profit, can be written as
w(1, 1)− c > 2α[w(1, 1)− w(1, 0)]. (3)
Intuitively, (3) requires that firm B’s marginal cost increase (w(1, 1)−c) is large relative
to firm A’s marginal cost increase α(w(1, 1) − w(1, 0)), once firm A has outsourced.
Obviously, the condition is more likely to be satisfied the higher A’s eﬃciency level
(i.e. the smaller α). Now consider the condition ∆1B < 0, which can be written as
(a+ αc− 2c)2 − [a+ αc− 2w(0, 1)]2 > 9bF. (4)
Relation (4) implies that, in contrast to the Puppy Dog case, firm B must face a large
marginal cost increase (w(0, 1) − c), so as to make outsourcing unattractive despite of
the fixed cost savings. Otherwise, outsourcing by firm B alone would be profitable. The
condition ∆2B > 0, in turn, may be written as
(a+ αw(1, 0)− 2c)2 − [a+ αw(1, 1)− 2w(1, 1)]2 < 9bF. (5)
This condition is simply the reverse of (2). That is, (5) is more likely to be satisfied
the larger the raising rivals’ cost eﬀect on firm A, and the smaller the own marginal cost
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increase. In this case, the condition is more likely to be satisfied if firm A is relatively
ineﬃcient (α is high).
However, for a Fat Cat strategy to be a part of an equilibrium, firm A also needs
to prefer a situation where both firms outsource over one where both firms produce in-
house (πA(1, 1) > πA(0, 0)); otherwise, firm A would not be willing to trigger successive
outsourcing. As can be easily checked, πA(1, 1) > πA(0, 0) is the more likely to hold the
smaller (w(1, 1) − c)(2α − 1) is compared to the fixed cost, F . Hence, in equilibrium,
the Fat Cat strategy is more likely to be adopted the smaller F , the more eﬃcient firm
A (the smaller α),13 and the smaller the marginal cost increase (w(1, 1)− c) when both
firms outsource.
4.3 Lean & Hungry Look
As indicated in Table 1, the Lean & Hungry Look strategy will be adopted in equilibrium
if both ∆1B < 0 < ∆2B and ∆2−B < 0 are satisfied. Hence, compared to the Fat Cat
strategy the only diﬀerence is that outsourcing by firm B has a negative rather than a
positive eﬀect on firm A’s profit (∆2−B < 0). Rewriting this condition yields
w(1, 1)− c < 2α [w(1, 1)− w(1, 0)] , (6)
which requires that firm A’s marginal cost increase α(w(1, 1)−w(1, 0)) is large relative
to firm B’s increase (w(1, 1)− c) . Note that (6) is more easily satisfied if firm A is
relatively ineﬃcient (α is high).
For a Lean & Hungry Look strategy to be a part of an equilibrium, however, firm
A also needs to prefer a situation where no firm outsources over one where both firms
outsource (πA(0, 0) > πA(1, 1)); otherwise, firm A would prefer successive outsourcing.
This is more likely to be the case, the larger (w(1, 1) − c)(2α − 1) is compared to the
fixed cost, F . Hence, a Lean & Hungry Look strategy is the more likely to emerge in
equilibrium the larger F , the less eﬃcient firm A is (the larger α), and the larger the
marginal cost increase (w(1, 1)− c) when both firms outsource.
4.4 Top Dog
Finally, consider the Top Dog strategy. We have pointed out above that, in equilibrium,
firm A will never adopt this strategy, since outsourcing by firm B alone cannot hurt firm
A. That is, ∆1−B < 0 cannot be satisfied. The linear Cournot model under consideration
13In combination with (5), this indicates that α must have an intermediate value for the Fat Cat
strategy to emerge in equilibrium.
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nicely illustrates this finding. In order to satisfy ∆1−B < 0, we would need to assume
that w(0, 1) < c, which is in contradiction to assumption (A1).
4.5 A Numerical Example
In order to illustrate the above analysis, let us consider a numerical example of the
linear Cournot model with the following parameter values: a = 50, b = 1, c = 1, α =
4, w(1, 0) = 2.9 and w(0, 1) = 3. Furthermore, for each value of w(1, 1), we assume
that the fixed cost level F is such that it does not dominate the strategic incentives for
outsourcing (not outsourcing, respectively).14 In Figure 1, the curve labelled ∆2B −∆1B
indicates how outsourcing by firm A aﬀects the profitability of firm B’s outsourcing
for various values of w(1, 1).15 The two other curves show how outsourcing by firm B
aﬀects the profit of firm A (∆1−B and ∆2−B, respectively). Since w(VA, VB) is increasing
in Vi, i = A,B by (A2), we solely consider cases where w(1, 1) > 3.
<Figure 1 around here>
First note that, independent of the value of w(1, 1), firmA is positively aﬀected byB’s
outsourcing alone (∆1−B > 0). It follows immediately that the Top Dog will not be part of
a strategy combination forming an equilibrium. If w(1, 1) is relatively small, outsourcing
by B alone is profitable, whereas successive outsourcing is not (∆2B−∆1B < 0). Since the
profit of firm A is positively aﬀected by B’s outsourcing alone (∆1−B > 0), A will adopt
the Puppy Dog strategy. If w(1, 1) is at an intermediate level, successive outsourcing is
profitable from B’s point of view (∆2B−∆1B > 0). Also, outsourcing by B aﬀects firm A’s
profit positively, and firm A will adopt the Fat Cat strategy so as to trigger outsourcing
by firm B. Finally, if w(1, 1) is large, successive outsourcing is still profitable from firm
B’s point of view. However, outsourcing by firm B aﬀects firm A’s profit negatively.
Firm A will thus adopt the Lean & Hungry Look strategy.
5 Conclusions
We have shown that firms may strategically outsource the production of an input good to
an imperfectly competitive input market so as to soften competition in the final product
14For example, if w(1, 1) is in a medium range such that firm A should adopt the Fat Cat strategy for
strategic reasons (see Figure 1), F must be suﬃciently large for A’s profit to be higher with successive
outsourcing than with no outsourcing.
15For instance, if outsourcing by A prevents further outsourcing (∆1B > 0 > ∆2B), we have ∆2B−∆1B <
0. Conversely, if outsourcing by A triggers further outsourcing (∆1B < 0 < ∆2B), we have ∆2B−∆1B > 0.
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market. More specifically, if firms face a trade-oﬀ between bearing the fixed cost of in-
house production at low variable cost and avoiding this fixed cost, but incurring higher
marginal cost, and if, in addition, input prices vary with the industry’s vertical structure,
outsourcing may serve as an instrument of collusion or raising rivals’ cost.
Our analysis of a reduced-form model has demonstrated that (depending on para-
meter values) three diﬀerent types of equilibria may emerge:
(i) There may be an asymmetric outsourcing equilibrium where one firm produces
the input good in-house whereas the other acquires it from the input market. In this
equilibrium, the first-mover follows a Puppy Dog strategy and strategically abstains
from outsourcing so as to not prevent outsourcing by the second firm. By preventing an
initial increase of the input price, the second firm is induced to outsource and thus to
increase its own marginal cost.
(ii) There may be a symmetric equilibrium where both firms outsource. In this
equilibrium, the first firm decides to outsource so as to trigger further outsourcing by
the second firm (the Fat Cat strategy). Firms successively outsource to mutually raise
their marginal costs, thereby softening competition in the final product market. That
is, firms may generate a wave of consecutive outsourcing decisions so as to collude in the
retail market.
(iii) There may be another symmetric equilibrium where none of the firms outsources.
In this equilibrium, the first firm does not outsource to avoid triggering outsourcing by
the second firm (the Lean & Hungry Look strategy). Intuitively, this equilibrium may
emerge if the softening of competition generated by a wave of outsourcing decisions is
insuﬃcient to compensate the first firm for its marginal cost increase. The first firm will
then strategically prevent successive outsourcing.
Our results are based on a reduced-form analysis and apply irrespective of whether
product market decisions are strategic substitutes or strategic complements. They sug-
gest that it is crucial to account for the price eﬀects of outsourcing both at the down-
stream and at the upstream level of the industry to better understand the economics of
outsourcing decisions. In fact, upstream price eﬀects associated with strategic outsourc-
ing might be even more important in vertically-related industries with specific (rather
than non-specific) input goods. Future research will have to address this question.
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Table 1: Taxonomy of business strategies
Should A outsource for strategic reasons?
Outsourcing by A ...
... prevents outsourcing by B. ... triggers outsourcing by B.
(∆1B > 0 > ∆2B) (∆1B < 0 < ∆2B)
Outsourcing by B ...
... increases A’s profit. No Yes
(∆1−B > 0 or ∆2−B > 0) “Puppy Dog” “Fat Cat”
... decreases A’s profit. Yes No
(∆1−B < 0 or ∆2−B < 0) “Top Dog” “Lean & Hungry Look”
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B2 B1
Puppy Dog Lean &Hungry LookFat Cat
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Figure 1: Taxonomy of firm A ’s business strategies for the parameter values a = 50, b =
1, c = 1, α = 4, w(1, 0) = 2.9, w(0, 1) = 3, and 3 < w(1, 1) ≤ 3.3.
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